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Spanish policy toward Central America: the 
Socialist Governments Period 
From the very beginning, E. Gonzalez wan- 
ted to become an important actor in Central 
America's crisis. Anyway, his responsabili- 
ties as leader of the Opposition were very 
different as his appointment as President of 
the International Socialist Commission for 
support to Sandinism shows. Once he beca- 
me Prime Minister, he played a much more 
mixed and subtle role, and he let this Com- 
mission without real action at all. His con- 
nections with Carlos Andfes Pérez and ot- 
her Social-Democrat leaders in Latin 
America made him change his perceptions 
about the real character of Sandinism. Many 
errors of the Nicaraguan Government to- 
ward Spain (their at least moral support of 
ETA activities in their country, especially) 
helped to created a quite cold attitude of 
Gonzalez toward Sandinist actions. 
At the same time, the lack of understan- 
ding with S. Duarte and Monge, together 
with the fact that Spain had broken diplo- 
matic relations with Guatemala, after the ir- 
ruption of Guatemalan police in the Spanish 
Embassy, with the result of more than 30 ki- 
lled and injured people, made it quite diffi- 
cult to have a well developed plan to increa- 
se Spain's role in that area. 
From the global international relations 
perspective, the peak of the aNew cold Warr 
led by the Reagan Administration transfor- 
med the Nicaraguan question in a geostra- 
tegical issue, combined with a prestige issue. 
The efforts of Gonzalez's Government to sof- 
ten tensions was perceived as irrelevant and 
almost a nuisance by Washington. 
Spanish dtrategy was essentially led by 
Gonzalez, but his first Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, E Moran, put an additional touch of 
defence of a European role in that area, led 
by Spain, which was on the verge of be- 
coming a member of the European Commu- 
nities, claiming that U.S. had the essential 
role in Central America, but their attitudes 
were erroneous; Europe had to play a spe- 
cific game to help to that crisis in a North- 
South and regional dimension, instead of an 
East-West one. Not withstanding the pressu- 
res of Washington, and the clear reluctance 
of the United Kingdom and the G.D.R., Spain 
played an important role in the establish- 
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ment of a connection between the E.E.C. and 
Central America with the four succesive 
((San Joséa Summits, which had a more 
symbolic character than an economic one. 
At the same time, things had changed in 1 
Central America the Contadora process was 
almost dying; and their efforts, led by Me- 
xica, faced the hostile attitudes of El Salva- 
dor and Honduras (completely depending on 
Washington's funds) and the progressive ra- 
dicalisation of the Sandinist Government. In 
the meantime, the accession of Arias to po- 
wer, the reintroduction of diplomatic rela- 
tions between Guatemala and Spain, and the 
Irangate-Contragate scandal, which paraly- 
sed for some months Reagan's Administra- 
tion, made a good opportu~ity for Gonzalez 
to help to put in action the Arias-Esquipulas 
system. 
In 1987-88 visits of Central American lea- 
ders and diplomats to Madrid have been 
continuous; and the softening relations bet- 
ween the Superpowers after Reykiavik allo- 
wed a parallel retreat in Afghanistan and Ni- 
caragua. Spain has taken profit of this global 
change to increase its role in Central Amer- 
ica; made pressures towards Sandinism to 
hasten its pace of concessions and has ac- 
cepted to become part of an international 
team to control the disarmament process 
with in Nicaraguan borders. With this issue, 
Spain and Gonzalez have acquired a.more 
relevant leadership in the relations of Latin 
America with the E.E.C. which might sup- 
pose a more intense economic and political 
cooperation between these two regional 
systems. 
The export of arms from Spain to Latin America in 
the 1980's 
Afíter the Middle East and Magreb, Latin 
America is the region to which the greatest 
amount of rnilitary material is exported by Spa- 
nish arms manufacturers. At constant 1987 pri- 
ces, total exports of rnilitary material from 
Spah to Latin America came to more than 
104,000 d o n  pesetas for the period 1980- 
1987. Calculated at the separate exchange ra- 
tes of each year in the aforementioned period 
this ifigure reaches the total of 650 million do- 
llars. 
About 58% of these exports were made in 
the years 1982-1984, and reached a peak in 
1982. This means that the greatest quantity of 
arms, were signed during the period of the 
UCD govemment. Given the leading role pla- 
yed by the INI in these transactions, responsi- 
bility for exportation of the arms lies squarely 
with the UCD govemment. 
lnternational debt crisis and role of the world 
monetary market: the impasse 
The limits of the debt could not be deter- 
mined in advance so it was erroneously con- 
cluded that they did not exist. 
I1 was repeatedly stated that these states 
couXd not go bankrupt. There would have 
been no limit to their continua1 acceptance 
of c~redit if their economic policies had com- 
plied with market demands, thus the possi- 
bility of a global debt crisis was never seri- 
ouslly entertained. The IMF and other 
institutions were merely talking of the debt 
some countries ahd run up when 40 of them 
had gone bankrupt. 
I will attempt in the present work to analy- 
se the process and volume of the increasing 
debt of third world countries together with 
the relations which have come into existen- 
ce with the new type of dependence associ- 
ated with these countries. The growing in- 
terest payments at the start of the 1980's 
brought about the international third world This situation signifies a return to a form 
debt the result of which is the confirmation of slavery for the countries in debt and, by 
that this process is dynamic and that it tends the sarne token, it converts the lending coun- 
to be self-propagating. In short, there is an tries into recipients of incomes from the 
interest in debt because of the ever- countries in debt. 
increasing interest to be paid, and vice versa. 
Power and Communication Model in Nicaragua. 
From Somoza Garcia to Sandinismo 
The social, economic and political system 
determines in each historical moment, at the 
same level the organizational structure of the 
mass media and the communication process 
that is taking place in this Society. From this 
point of view, it is possible to define clearly 
two stages in Nicaragua. The first begins in 
1933, when starts making a mass commu- 
nication system is set up as we know it now, 
at the time that the first National Radio 
Broadcast is made, associated with the Na- 
tional Guard, the militia that supported the 
dynastic dictatorship of the Somoza family, 
that protected the U.S. business in the zone. 
It is marked by the concentration and con- 
trol of the media property in the hands of 
the powerful oligarchy, and because of the 
fight to overthrow the dictatorship within 
the county, on political, military and com- 
munication fronts. It ends on the 19 July 
1979, when the second stage begins, with the 
victory of the revolution. The Sandinista Na- 
tional Liberation Front (FSLN), acting as the 
hegemonic power of the new process, of so- 
cialist content based on political pluralism, 
mixed economy and non-alignment. For tho- 
se reasons a public-private mixed system ex- 
ploitation of the mass media has been esta- 
blished, in which the informative pluralism 
is continued, although in some aspects the 
censorship exists, justified by the war situ- 
ation in the country. This war is reflected in 
the ideological pressure put on the Nicara- 
guan people by mass media both from insi- 
de and outside. This pressure in an attempt 
to make the established order illegitimate. 
Subsystemic approximation to international 
economic relations 
The international economy is currently ideas and capital across borders, the finan- 
characterised by a number of obvious signs cia1 result of which is reflected in the balan- 
of interdependence between the various sta- ce of payments of the different states. 
tes which make up this economy. In addition, simultaneous interactions bet- 
This signs of interdependence are mani- ween state and non-state participants, and 
fested in the movement of goods, people, their decisions, serve to direct b ~ t h  the va- 
rious national economies and the internati- 
ona1 economy as a whole. 
In this respect it is worth taking into ac- 
count tht a distinction is customarily made 
between international relations (when par- 
ticipants are nation-states) and transnational 
relatrons (when one, at least, of the partici- 
pants involved belongs to the private cate- 
gory: multinational company, non- 
governmental organisation, etc.) 
We must also remember that international 
economic relations can cause conflict in 
i'erms of cooperation and integration. This 
depends on the degree to which the indivi- 
dual objectives of the various participants 
can be reconciled within the framework of 
whatever sigils of interdependence are dealt 
with. 
The present work considers the following: 
1) The quantitative growth of international 
relations. 
2) The qualitative modification of internati- 
ona1 relations. 
3) State subsystems in international econom- 
ic relations. 
4) International economic relations between 
subsystems. 
5) The present and future role of transnati- 
ona1,enterprises in international economic 
relations. 
Past and present of mi.litary power in Chile 
Military power has been a subject of cons- 
tant discussion in all sector of Chilean soci- 
ety since, in 1973, the violent eruption of the 
armed forces put an end to the country's 
century-old tradition of democracy. 
In 1980 the political constitution of the 
country was definitively laid down and, in 
1988, the authoritarian regime will attempt 
to prolong its 15 year-old rule via the 
ballot-box. 
As a result of these two events the follo- 
wing matters require the most intense dis- 
cussion: 
1) T:he trend towards an autonomy of mili- 
tary power and its aim of becoming a ru- 
ling and institutional guardian of the citi- 
zens and their sovereign decisions. 
2) The need to democratize the armed for- 
ces as a consequence of i). 
The following brief article presents a his- 
torical account of the prevailing models of 
civil-military relations in Chile, both before 
and after the events of 1973. It explains the 
origins of military power in the country, the 
historical development of military corpora- 
tism and both the military and ideological 
behaviour of the military institutions throug- 
hout the periods of the various prevailing 
doctrines. The article also deals with the pre- 
sent level of autonomy which these institu- 
tions have achieved. 
The crisis of the Yugoslavian Model 
Today's Yugoslavia attacts the externa1 ob- and Mediterranean landscapes we find a 
server as a strange and contradictory state. number of proposals struggling to shape the 
Together with the attractive alpine, Balkan country's future. This future, in a global sen- 
se constantly under construction, is at a de- 
cisive stage in which its very existence is to 
be settled, under constant threat from .the 
militaristic urges of the country's most con- 
servative elements. 
Given the prevailing crisis of world capi- 
talism, any alternative path of social 
construction deserves special attention for 
possible new, practica1 solutions to the de- 
mands for fairer and more balanced systems 
of political and economic organization. For 
the same reasons, we should also examine 
those social organizations in a situation of 
acute structural crisis, since only by unders- 
tanding the causes which trigger off these 
imabalances can new solutions be proposed. 
The situation of Yugoslavia is doubly 
thought-provoking in that its development 
paradoxically combines a socialist alterna- 
tive to capitalism with particularly acute so- 
cial and economic crisis. 
It should be remembered that the Yugos- 
lavian road to socialism has been forged 
amidst considerably difficulties. From the 
very start, the Yugoslavian revolution has 
constantly had to direct a proportion of its 
energies to countering the historically inhe- 
rited forces of disintegration to which it has 
been subjected. The new Yugoslavian state 
found itself hampered by the social atomi- 
zation of the Balkan area, where a complex 
mixture of cultures, religions and nationali- 
ties, in a situation of conflict for centuries, 
would only see this conflict resolved by ex- 
ternal intervention. Thanks, effectively, to 
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the brutal occupation of the Italian and, spe- 
cially, ~ e r m a n  armies, a pan-~ugoslavian 
feeling spread throught the country at a pre- 
viously unimaginable rate. In such a situati- 
on, it became obvious to the Balkan peoples 
that they would have to unite, and put asi- 
de their lingering interna1 squabbles. 
It was the Yugoslavian communists who 
provided, at the right moment, an answer to 
this historical imperative. At the end of the 
dispute they enjoyed great prestige largely 
due to their introduction, after the other so- 
cial forces had been neutralized, of a politi- 
cal line which permitted both the survival 
of the peoples and the defeat and expulsion 
of the invaders. The privileged situation in 
which they found themselves allowed them 
to construct the foundations of a Yugoslavi- 
an state which tended to a better balance 
between the nationalities. This could, pos- 
sibly, have led to the better-developed repu- 
blics such as Croatia and Slovenia resisting 
such a move, but in the circumstances the 
sacrifice would have been accepted in the 
strongly cohesive postwar environment. 
Nonetheless, the break with the USSR, ex- 
plicable perhaps as an attempt to distance 
the country somewhat from Stalin's adictat,,, 
was responsible for the beginnings of chan- 
ge. Although no important numerical losses 
were suffered by the party (the Komminfor- 
mist purges were of negligible effect), the ap- 
paratus soon began to lose its capacity to 
transform. 
